I. INTRODUCTION
The original design of the First Amendment petition clause--stemming from the right to petition local assemblies in colonial America, and series of anti-slavery "gag rules" that effectively abolished the right of petition.
II. PETITIONING IN COLONIAL AMERICA
The first recorded act of business in the colony of Connecticut concerned a grievance that one Henry Stiles had "traded a peece [firearm] with the Indians for Corne." The magistrates who formed the colony's first assembly admonished Stiles, and ordered him to regain the instrument ("in a faire & legall waye"); then, turning to public legislation, the body resolved that "henceforth none yt are within the Jurisdic[tion] of this Court, shall trade with the natiues or Indians any peece or pistoll or gunn or powder or shott . . .
From one colonist's remonstrance against his neighbor, Connecticut's first act was passed. Similarly, other colonial governments, facing the myriad difficulties of settlement and struggling to regulate all dimensions of colonial life, were led "willy-nilly" by their inhabitants' petitions for legislation." Vested with a variety of police, legislative, and judicial powers, assemblies responded to a wide spectrum of petitioners' concerns. They adjudicated local offenses, disciplined servants' misfeasances, enacted sumptuary laws, regulated tobacco packaging, and controlled colonists' wages. No sharp line dividing constituents from representatives existed to separate control of the legislative agenda from colonists' initiatives. Petitions assured a seamlessness of public and private governance. Assemblies would receive petitions, refer them to committees for consideration, and then act upon the committees' recommendations. This process originated more bills in pre-constitutional America than any other source of legislation. 1825 , at 19-20 (Massachusetts petitioners covered range of issues, "they petitioned for anything they wanted, and their wants were both varied and various;" committees which formed to hear petitions were equally varied); id. at 66 (diversity of Massachusetts committees hearing petitions). See generally M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 209-10 (1943) (assemblies extended authority by responding to petitioners).
9. Perusal of the CONNECTICUT RECORDS highlights this fact. For example, in the Connecticut General Assembly (its early name was the General Court) session of May, 1773, over five-sixths of the resolutions were direct responses to residents' petitions and still the Assembly postponed consideration of a further 250 petitions, including one petition from a slave. At this session, petitioners prompted a naturalization bill, a reversal of a superior court judgment, debt discharges, public fishery regulations, roadmaking resolutions, Indian land delimitations (upon petition by Indians), town tax revisions, and constable replacements. See 14 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 94-132, 152-55 (1773); see Vol. 96: 142, 1986 The dialogue of petition and response between inhabitants and colonial assemblies was intimately related to the structure of colonial politics. 1 0 From the beginning, the primary responsibility of colonial assemblies was the settlement of private disputes raised by petitions. The young assemblies, struggling for domestic authority, were especially attentive to citizens' grievances and recognized that responsiveness to petitions was a way of extending their jurisdiction. In addition, the local character of colonial politics, where assemblies responded to information from inhabitants, even the disenfranchised, made petitions vital initiatives for governmental actions.
These conditions were the foundation for colonial assemblies' reliance on, and inhabitants' ready recourse to, petitioning. That is, colonial assemblies, accustomed to quasi-judicial lawmaking and anxious to encourage petitions as sources of both jurisdiction and information, generally favored citizens' rights to assembly consideration.
A. The Judicial Role of Colonial Assemblies
Connecticut Colony's legislature, like other colonial assemblies, performed both legislative and judicial functions. 1 1 Petitions for private bills, petitions for public legislation, and petitions appealing courts' decisions relied on this blurring of legislative and adjudicative processes. Aggrieved persons could reformulate causes of action for judicial redress into grievances of abridged liberties in order to secure legislative relief. At the same time, petitioners' broad right to raise any matter for assembly consideration itself impeded the development of separation of powers in colonial governments. 12 also R. BAILEY R. BAILEY, supra note 9, gives a picture of early petitioning in the colony of Virginia. All social classes were free to present complaints or requests to the House of Burgesses. Prior to 1660, this was done in person; thereafter, local sheriffs posted notice of courthouse reception dates. In 1666, the House of Burgesses established the Committee for Propositions and Grievances, which was reponsible for investigating petitions. The volume of petitions continued to increase into the eighteenth century; between 1750 and 1800 the legislature received on average over 200 petitions per session. Id. at 23-46. Assembly responsiveness and impartiality depended on the homogeneity of the Virginian colonial community, however. Just as the erosion of this condition reduced the general utility of petitioning in Virginia (after 1800, petitions for legislative reapportionment, for internal improvements, and on slavery matters were tangled in East-West sectional controversy), id. at 169-74, anti-slavery petitioning to Congress was also a casualty of sharp regional and party disputes. See infra Section IV.
11. See M. CLARKE, supra note 8, at 15-60.
12. Black, Nathaniel Byfield, 1653-1733, in 62 PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF
Adjudication of Private Disputes: The Connecticut Colony
Most petitions in the early colonies involved private disputes that the assemblies, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, would investigate and resolve. Partly because the early colonies lacked strong judicial institutions, the legislatures heard and resolved these conflicts." 3 In 1770, Connecticut's General Assembly promulgated only fifteen laws on its own initiative, while acting on over 150 causes, in law and equity, brought by petitioners.1 4 A representative complaint alleged that one "George Nichols had in an undue manner by artful and oppressive means . . .obtained and gotten from the petitioner a deed of his house and lands . . . .,,a The assembly, after considering a detailed committee report, declared the deed null and void. ' Most early legislation was of similar minute, adjudicatory character. As a result, it proceeded haphazardly, each bill a response to the special circumstances pleaded by petition. Debt actions,' 17 estate distributions,' 8 and divorce proceedings' were frequently brought by petitioners for legislative settlement. Criminal cases appeared as well, most often in the form of prayers for modification of sentence. 20 Regularly, the reply to a petitioner was legislation reversing a lower court's judgment."'
Adjudication and Public Petitions
Many petitions prompted legislation of general applicability. For example, in 1723, the Connecticut General Assembly affirmed the Connecticut superior courts' appellate jurisdiction over appeals against non-residents MASSACHUSETTS 57, 79 (1984 Vol. 96: 142, 1986 upon receipt of a petition against a judicial ruling to the contrary. 22 In 1686, in direct response to a petitioner's dispute over the conveyance of inheritance titles, the assembly declared that "all lands dissposed by courts in distributions of estates in land to legatees . . . shall belong to the sayd legatees and their heires and assignes forever." 23 In addition to initiating legislation, petitioners also asked for the enforcement of existing laws. Thus, in 1685, the Assembly responded to a petitioner's request for a quasi-judicial opinion affirming a law requiring "[lands to be tendered to the Town before they be sold to any but to the inhabitants of the same town where they be situate." ' 24 These quasi-judicial responses to petitions regularly involved extensive factual examinations, for which the Assembly delegated considerable powers to committees 2 5 or local officials. 26 The task of verifying the facts alleged in petitions led to authority to compel the attendance of witnesses and petitioners. 2 7 The above actions illustrate the uncircumscribed original and appellate jurisdiction the General Assembly exercised in considering petitions. In fact, the Assembly did not divest itself of significant judicial responsibilities until the adoption of the Connecticut Constitution of 1818.28
Fair Hearing and Reformation of the Petitioning Process
The concentration of legislative and judicial authority in one governing body, coupled with the Colony's growth, led to a backlog of petitions. The priority of fair hearing generated ongoing attempts to retain a semblance of adjudicatory due process in the face of an oppressive number of petitions. This priority was especially manifest in the elaborate rules governing petition pleadings. Specifically, the Assembly's notice and counterpetition rules reflected the judicial character of petition consideration. 25. Land boundary issues required especially broad legislative investigation. In 1770, for example, the General Assembly replied to a land division petition by empowering a committee to redraw jurisdictional lines among three towns. 13 id. 398-99 (1770). Note, however, the response to the Assembly from a similarly commissioned committee nearly a century earlier: "'finding their task too hard for them, they left it not finished.'" 2 id. 86 & note * (1668).
26. The General Assembly would answer some petitions by ordering town selectmen to arbitrate disputes. E.g., 2 id. 84 (1668) (female petitioner's claim referred to town officials).
27. R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 111; see, e.g., 6 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 54 (1718) (act compelling petitioners' appearance before Assembly). And at times whole assemblies took on an investigatory role. One occurrence in Georgia provides a dramatic illustration of assembly response. The House, acting on petitions which alleged inhuman prison treatment, "'immediately resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole House upon said Petition,' and went in a body to the jail to look into the matter." R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 97 (citation omitted). Summons requirements were strict, 9 and petitions often were dismissed or postponed when concerned parties had not received notice." 0 Adverse testimony was important, for the act of petition or remonstrance "call [ed] for due witness to be borne against it ....
See generally
In 1744, the Assembly codified much of the adjudicatory process of petitioning. The new regulations required that adverse parties be cited, that summons and copies of the petition be supplied to all concerned persons, 32 and that "if upon the tryall of the cause it doth appear that either the petitioners or the person or persons cited doe or have given the other any uniust trouble, the party wronged shall be allowed his iust cost and damages as in other cases." '33 Eighteenth century commercial and demographic expansion in the Colony, along with the concomitant explosion of petitions in both law and equity, led to alterations in the method of legislative consideration. The Assembly sought to balance the guarantees of judicial proceedings against the volume of popular petitioning. Adopting a cautious attitude towards petitioning, "being sensible that the publick charge is much increased by a multiplicity of petitions for things of less value than the charge of deciding them, and the publick affairs also thereby further obstructed, ' "" the Assembly moved to restrict the numbers by raising fees for presenting petitions and limiting petitioners' access to the assembly according to amounts in controversy. A 1718 order denied consideration to petitions on matters of less than fifteen pounds. 3 5 Additional efforts to streamline the consideration process appeared in a 1762 order, requiring the Assembly secretary and petitioners' agents to regulate the daily flow of petitions by assigning each communication a docket number and confirming notification to concerned parties. 3 Vol. 96: 142, 1986 the assembly could abbreviate this process with direct debate and hand vote resolution. 8 Still, by late 1769, the business of adjudicating petitions became so onerous that the Assembly experimented by withdrawing the right of parties to hearings "viva voce" before the Assembly. 39 These provisions, a first trespass on the adjudicatory process of petition consideration, were hastily repealed as detrimental to the rights of the populace. 40 Whereas conditions of admissibility, such as amounts in controversy, were manipulated to ease the pressure of petitions, the judicial guarantee of full consideration for those petitions still heard remained inviolate.
The colonial assemblies did retain one important and longstanding restraint on petitioning, again of judicial character: the threat of contempt proceedings. Allegations discovered to be ambiguous or false could lead to dismissal 41 or to charges against the petitioner. In an early session, a Hartford petitioner was held in contempt for not substantiating his accusatory petition. 42 Petitioners faced more severe contempt charges when their prayers challenged colonial laws. 4 3 Thus, in 1675, recalcitrant petitioners from Stonington, who desired either the annulment of "prejudiciall" tax laws or "a clear discovery of the rule and reason upon which such acts are grounded, ' 44 provoked the Assembly's ire. Deciding that "such practices ought to be crushed and due testimonie to be borne against the same," the Assembly punished the petitioners with fines and barred several from public office. These several colonial episodes of conflict between the right to petition and the integrity of legislative bodies anticipated the nineteenth century controversy in Congress. If communications to one's representative could be arbitrarily ignored, refused, or punished as intrusions on legislative freedom, popular sovereignty was threatened. See G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 363 (For radical Whigs, petitions, instructions, and direct democracy were tied to distrust of representative institutions and refusal to identify individuals' rights with, or subordinate them to, the wills of elected representatives.). Undue assertions of parliamentary privilege-punishing petitioners who were said to menace the dignity of the assembly-jeopardized the entire institution of petitioning.
B. Petitions and the Extension of Legislative Jurisdiction
Colonial assemblies seized on petitions to extend their authority. 46 Struggling for authority to tax and, above all, to legislate, the young assemblies drew on their close associations with local inhabitants to legitimize their activities. 4 7 Petitioners often appealed for extraordinary relief, especially when existing law supplied no remedy. The trend of favorable assembly responses shows a steady extension of legislative reach into intercolony militia concerns, 48 local welfare, 49 the regulation of private law enforcement"° and Indian affairs, 51 all matters previously left either to private responsibility or to British authority.
Assembly aggrandizement was particularly enhanced by the volume of petitions calling for legislative responses in such areas as tax policy, 52 land distribution, 5 " monopoly grants, and trade and licensing privileges. 54 Manufacturing and turnpike companies, bank charters, ferry privileges and a variety of other operations in Connecticut's early economy were all acquired through petitions for assembly approval. Assembly authority necessarily expanded in schizophrenic manner. Petitioners retained vital, albeit uncoordinated, lawmaking initiative. Bills responded to the circumstances recited by each petition. Thus, for example, the Colony's tax laws 47. By the end of the seventeenth century, assemblies in all the colonies, save perhaps Delaware, had formed committees to consider grievances. R. HARLOW, supra note 8, at 9.
48. See, e.g., 2 CONNECTICUT RECORDS 276 (1676) (mother's successful petition for funds for neighboring colony's treatment and release of wounded militiaman).
49. CONNECTICUT RECORDS 309 (1657-58) (petition for right to contract with Indians); 2 id. 108 (1669) (tax relief to petitioner owning iron works); 2 id. 254-55 (1675) (ten year monopoly and tax immunity awarded to petitioner constructing mill to produce and export "rape oyle"); 2 id. 325 (1677) (petition for special export license); 4 id. 139 (1695) (petitions for permission to practice medicine); 4 id. 263 (1698) (petitioner authorized to levy bridge toll); 14 id. 128 (1773) (petition for fishery privileges).
were a babel of special measures enacted in response to individuals and towns' petitions for particular relief. 5 The jurisdictional growth of assemblies through the receipt and disposition of petitions was a complex process, forcing the legislatures to be sensitive to competing interests. Petitions for privileges and dispensations, such as fishery rights, land grants or town boundaries, indeed petitions on most controversial issues, involved a series of communications. A petitioner's application commonly led to an initial notice from the assembly soliciting counter-petitions. A committee examination followed, involving contact with all affected groups. Lastly, the assembly tallied the petitioners' requests, appraised the committee reports, and acted according to the public will. 56 Latent in this sequence was petitioners' threat of appeal through petitions to English authority. Colonial assemblies also used petitions to extend their authority against gubernatorial powers and to support jurisdictional claims against neighboring colonies. For example, in the spring of 1670, Connecticut's Governor Winthrop refused to grant the petition of Narragansett inhabitants who opposed Rhode Island's claims to the region. 8 Winthrop, who had himself negotiated the territorial concession, spoke against the General Assembly's jurisdictional authority to advocate the petitioners' prayer. His objection was ignored; 59 in fact, several years earlier the Assembly had responded to proprietors' petitions by repudiating the governor's agreement "inasmuch as it was entered into without authority from the General [Assembly] ." '60 The General Assembly's handling of several other petitions suggests its ability to restrain the authority of governors. Indians who petitioned for 55. See, e.g., 1 id. 201 (1649) (petitions led to tax modifications); 2 id. 188 (1672) (same); 2 id. 309 (1677) (same); 4 id. 55 (1691) (same); 14 id. 120 (1773) (same).
56. Jefferson's "Bill for Religious Freedom" was enacted in this manner. Between 1776 and 1786, several sessions of Virginia's House of Burgesses were "literally flooded" with petitions demanding dissenters' exemptions from taxes to support the Anglican Church. At last in 1785, the assembly formally requested Virginians to express their views. Thousands of petitions came in reply; over 11,000 opposed an assessment bill and just over 1,000 were in favor. R. BAILEY, supra note 9, at 46. the governor's benefactorship addressed their petition to the Assembly; the governor's own guard had to petition the Assembly for their arms and expenses; 62 and when petitions did go before the governor, they frequently came on referral from the Assembly. 63 When abusive petitions were sent directly to the governor, final authority for contempt proceedings rested in the Assembly's discretion. 4 Boundary petitions enabled the General Assembly to assert jurisdictional claims against neighboring colonies. Connecticut pressed its dispute with Rhode Island 6 5 on the ground that the inhabitants of the disputed lands, through petitions, had indicated that Connecticut was their preferred government. 66 In its negotiations with Rhode Island, the Connecticut Assembly insisted on its duty to respond to petitioners, to do "'what duty requires of us, in order to the relief of or oppressed neighbours . .
"67
Still more dramatic was the Connecticut Assembly's use of petitions to repeal a 1713 border agreement with Massachusetts. During negotiation of the agreement, the towns ceded to Massachusetts had not been consulted. Higher Massachusetts taxes provoked these towns, in 1747, to petition for re-joinder with Connecticut. Ignoring its agreement, the General Assembly voted to receive the petitioning towns. 6 8 Colonial assemblies similarly employed petitions to test and extend authority against British control. The numerous petitions for land grants facilitated the Connecticut Assembly's hasty distribution of territory to private owners. The action was provoked by the impending arrival of Sir Edmund Andros and the Crown's seizure of the New England colonies' governments and property. 6 Another incident arose from the fact that petitioners were often awarded trade privileges "any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
7 0 In 1709, when England passed a harsh customs law which Connecticut colonists thought infringed their charter rights, the Assembly took advantage of petitions from shipowners whose vessels had been seized to challenge the authority of the royal collector. Vol. 96: 142, 1986 protestations against the exercise of jurisdiction by colonial courts, the collector was evicted from office. 7 1
C. Petitions as Sources of Information in Colonial Politics
The adjudicatory character of early legislation and the colonial assemblies' self-aggrandizing efforts were predicated on the local nature of colonial politics. In communities that lacked developed media or party structures and that provided limited suffrage, petitioning supplied vital information to assemblies. Few representatives were trained as legislators; most were farmers, holding short terms of office and busy with private responsibilities. They had neither time nor expertise to discover independently the colony's woes or to determine solutions.
Thus, the town of Stonington began a 1668 petition with a common preface:
'Least multitude of busines might overwhelme you, & and our beeing remoat & as ovt of sight might too much burie us in oblivion, or want of information might render you the les sensible of our condition, wee make bold to remind you, & if it maye bee to add a litell breath to the saylls and fethers to the winges of your solicitous indeavours in our behalfe ....
Information from petitions was essential to the Colony's system of providing for those in need. Public funds to reimburse those who cared for orphans, the sick, or the insane, assistance to towns in times of hardship, and protection of debtors all depended upon the continual flow of petitions from individuals and towns. 7 " Not only the enfranchised population, but also unrepresented groups-notably women, 74 felons, 7 5 Indians,7" and, in some cases, slaves 7 -represented themselves and voiced grievances through petitions. This broadening of participation and access to relief mitigated some of the hardship of limited colonial suffrage. The right to petition vested these groups with a minimum form of citizenship: petitioning meant that no group in colonial society was entirely without political power. (approval of emancipation petition from "a negro man slave" owned by resident who joined British).
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 96: 142, 1986 Legislation, particularly concerning agricultural and commercial developments 7 8 proceeded in trial-and-error fashion and was periodically modified according to the opinions of petitioners. Information from petitions also led to foundings of new towns and counties 7 9 settlements of boundary disputes 8 " and efforts at internal improvements. 8 " The history of roadmaking in colonial Connecticut can be traced through colonists' petitions to their towns and the General Assembly. Petitioners seeking convenient routes to Sabbath gatherings, for example, confronted counter-petitioners who were fearful that roads would cut up their tillage. 82 Petitioning was also used to expose public oppressions. Maladministration or corruption among public agents," excessive taxation, 84 injustices perpetrated by courts 5 and misconduct by local officials (for example, bad magistrates 6 or lax church wardens 8 7 ) were brought to public attention by petitioners' ire.
Close assembly oversight of colonists' spiritual behavior was assured by the stream of information from ecclesiastical petitions. 88 89. Likewise, Baptist towns provoked Congregationalists to petition for relief. In 1711, for example, the Congregationalists of Swansea, Massachusetts petitioned the General Court to divide Swansea into two towns. Conscious of the volatile circumstances surrounding the request, the Court invited Swansea's selectmen to counter-petition. Elaborate legal arguments and accusations were exchanged. The Court considered more petitions and appointed a committee to investigate; the Congregationalists threatened to petition the Privy Council. At last, in 1727, the Congregationalist town of Barrington instance, when a tax exemption law expired in 1739, Massachusetts Baptists commissioned agents to petition the General Court [Assembly] for reenactment. The petitioners were requested to submit preferred measures; when the Assembly made revisions, the Baptists' agents drafted a second petition protesting that the changes "'by no means redress the Grievances complained of by ye people called Baptists.' "90
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE NEW NATION
The right of petition, so fundamental in colonial politics, was included in the Bill of Rights. 9 1 That the Framers meant to imply a corresponding governmental duty of a fair hearing seems clear given the history of petitioning in the colonies and the colonists' outrage at England's refusal to listen to their grievances. 2 The ratification controversy itself was, in large part, a debate among Federalist and Antifederalist petitioners and state assemblies. In Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, widespread petitioning provided the catalyst for ratification conventions. 9 " Although Congress, in its first session, approved the right of petition virtually without comment, two historic episodes are noteworthy. First, when Madison introduced his proposed list of amendments on June 8, 1789, he separated the clause for the rights of assembly, consultation, and petition from the clause containing the free expression guarantees of was formed. 1 W. McLoUGHLIN citizens petitioned the assembly. Despite its failure, this well documented counter-petition campaign provides vivid insight into the mechanics of petitioning (e.g., form petitions, distributions, counterpetitions, solicitation strategies) just prior to adoption of the petition clause in the Bill of Rights.
Significantly, the Pennsylvania Assembly's decision "not to attend to" a petition of 750 inhabitants opposed to ratification provoked outcry against such "contempt and obloquy" of petitioners' rights. 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 44. The Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (Dec. 19, 1787) responded: "Is it improper for freemen to petition for their rights? If it be; then I say that the impropriety consisted only in their not demanding them." Id. at 45.
The Yale Law Journal
Vol. 96: 142, 1986 speech and the press. 94 The express function of the assembly-petition clause was to protect citizens "applying to the Legislature . . . for a redress of their grievances.
'' 1 5 Second, both the House and Senate debated whether to include with the guarantees of free speech, press, and petition, "the people's right to 'instruct their Representatives.' "96 Members defeated the amendment 7 because they feared that obligatory instructions would subvert Congress' deliberative character and lead to irreconcilable factionalism. Yet, in statements denying the right, members expressly affirmed Congress' duty to receive and consider, although not to be bound by, citizens' communications. Thus, while refusing to vest individuals and groups with the power to bind Congress, and while guarding jealously their discretion to judge and reject instructions as unwise, the Framers of the Bill of Rights nonetheless maintained that citizens' "instructions," like petitions, would be heard and considered. 98 Indeed, in Congress' first decades petitions were received and considered, typically by referral to committees. The petition-response mechanism dealt procedurally with such controversial issues as contested election results, 9 9 the National Bank, 100 the expulsion of Cherokees from Georgia, 10 1 land distribution,' 1 0 2 the abolition of dueling,' 0 3 government in the Nonetheless, systemic strains appeared early in the nineteenth century. Since the daily business of Congress began with the reading by each state of its petitions, too many petitions could bring proceedings to a standstill. Groups like the American Anti-Slavery Society emerged with national constituencies able to mobilize such petitioning drives. The development of nationwide petitioning efforts, coupled with the Jacksonian sentiment that representatives owe "unrelaxing responsibility to the vigilance of public opinion," ' 1 0 7 made the petitioning process less a means by which legislators were informed of public opinion, and more an offensive device for propaganda. Failure to satisfy the petitioners' demands became a political garrote for accountability. 0 8
Fundamentally, the right of petition lacked a secure foundation in the national legislature. Its roots in local assemblies vested with investigatory duties disappeared. The close geographical association between petitioners and colonial legislatures was lost. 1 9 Developing judicial institutions re- (1857) (by early 1799, over 6,000 signatures against Acts sent to committee, which reported unfavorably; debate lengthened because "subject . . .had been brought before the House by the people, and ought, therefore, to receive a full discussion," id. at 384 108. In arguing that the ballot was sufficient protection for popular sovereignty, the Federalists anticipated precisely this danger of inserting in the Constitution a petition clause which "'give [s] people an idea, that as individuals, or in town meetings, they have a power paramount to that of the moved private grievances from legislative attention. 1 1 Congress, with its enumerated constitutional powers, did not rely on petitions to expand its jurisdictional reach. Finally, broadened franchise and the evolving party system diminished the need for legislators to inform themselves through popular, localized petitions.
IV. THE CRISIS OVER ABOLITIONIST PETITIONS
The slavery dispute brought these strains to a crisis. When abolitionists, invoking the First Amendment petition guarantee to secure a hearing and response, began to petition aggressively in the 1830's, Congress chose to retreat behind a legislative process that was inhospitable to activist petitioning."" Congress first reacted to the abolitionists with motions to refuse their prayers.
1 12 Later, members urged that petitions be tabled immediately or referred to select committees but that no action be taken.,,' In 1840, the House capitulated to Southern pressure for an absolute "gag" on antislavery papers by stating that no petitions or resolutions "praying the abolition of slavery. . . shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever. 1 1 4 Controversy over both this and previous "gag rules"
provoked heated discussion of the constitutional meaning of the right to petition. 
A. The Southern Position
Championing the slave-holding states in the Senate, John Calhoun viewed the requirement of consideration as a grave menace and a fundamental violation of each house's constitutional right to determine the rules of its proceedings." 6 Southern representatives denied that the right of petition extended to control of assembly action, arguing that assemblies would be little more than "passive receptacles" were petitioners' rights held superior to legislative necessities. 11 7 Thus, Calhoun supported a sharp demarcation between citizenry and legislators. The right of the former to assemble and communicate opinions to the government ceased upon presentation of a petition; 11 thereafter, the legislative domain was absolute and the assembly had full discretion to interpret and devise its own rules. 119 Southerners also decried petitioners' use of the government to interrogate the South on its laws, policies and institutions. 12 0 Southern representatives refused to allow petitioners to compel a moral debate on the subject of slavery. 1 " 1 "Such a contest is beyond mortal endurance," Calhoun argued, "[w]e must in the end be humbled, degraded, broken down, and worn out." ' 122 Charging that abolitionists' petitions were designed for agitation and not for genuine redress of grievances, 123 Southern members stressed the preservation of states' rights. Abolitionists could have no voice in the design of Southern institutions. "The discussion, on our part," exclaimed Congressman Rayner of North Carolina, "is of a defensive character-we want no discussion-we call for no action-but we simply ask to be let alone."
1 24
Southerners accused anti-slavery petitioners of guising libel and sedition as free discussion. 2 5 They were adamant that petitioners could seek only redress of grievances that were felt and manifest; no petitioner was entitled to initiate legislation which would leave her or him unaffected. gument against petitioners' right to hearing. Denying Congress' constitutional authority to abolish slavery, Calhoun concluded that individuals seeking abolition had no just right to petition the legislature. His states' rights and nullification doctrines 3 0 described a federal government of strictly limited powers whose constitutive charter recognized slavery and conceded its control to states. Reasoning from the alleged constitutional immunity of slavery, members opposed recognition of abolitionists' petitions.
1 3 The contest centered on reception; once petitions were admitted and jurisdiction conceded, further protest could attack only the substance of petitions and not the extension of federal authority over slavery. 13 2 But improper jurisdiction itself was unclear. Abolitionists prudently narrowed their target to slavery in the nation's capital. 1 3 Whereas Southerners saw the strategy bridging to a campaign against the South, in fact the restraint undermined the pro-slavery opposition to Congressional overreaching. Though most representatives acknowledged the states' absolute authority to legislate with respect to slavery, lawmaking for the District of Columbia was altogether different. 1 4 Express constitutional language vested Congress with lawmaking power over the capital.1 35 Proslavery advocates retorted that the duties of Congress towards the capital must parallel those of a local legislature, attentive only to its inhabitants. 1 3 " Moreover, Virginia and Maryland claimed that their cession of lands to the District included an implicit guarantee that property (slaves) would remain inviolate. Again, this Southern position contradicted the original meaning of the petition right, for in colonial America citizens petitioned assemblies for relief precisely when existing law offered no answer. The assemblies, in turn, encouraged petitions which might extend their jurisdiction. 
B. The Northern Anti-Slavery Position
The leading spokesman in Congress for the anti-slavery petitioners was John Quincy Adams. Though sympathetic to the anti-slavery cause, Adams regarded abolitionist petitioning as politically ill-advised."' 8 Nonetheless, he thought himself obliged to present the papers. 139 Congress had to protect the citizenry's two constitutional means of approaching the government: periodic election and continual instruction through petitioning. 140 Defending the right of every person to petition Congress, whatever the motive, Adams declared that each petition was entitled to a hearing on its merits. 14 1
Participation by ballot and petition not only assured popular control of government, but also attached to each citizen responsibility for the nation's laws, or lack thereof.
14 2 Slavery, above all slavery in the nation's capital, was an affront to the national conscience. Petitions, because they entailed personal commitment and resolve, 143 were encouraged as means by which citizens could disassociate themselves from the evils of slavery. William Channing, a leading abolitionist, proclaimed: "The District of Columbia fastens on the whole nation the guilt of slaveholding . . . .And I hold it the duty of every man in the free States . . .by solemn remonstrance to Congress, to purge his conscience of the nation's crime.1 1 44
Abolitionists also argued that slavery caused direct grievance because it intruded on national affairs, threatened domestic tranquility, and obstructed interstate relations. 14 5 Such injuries, they claimed, warranted the petitioning by free states for legislative change. 146 And even if Northern interests were less evident, the First Amendment protection of petitioning was said to be absolute. No personal, social or moral conditions could be imposed on the exercise of the right. 147 Abolitionists warned that a "gag" against anti-slavery petitions might, with equal facility, silence other matters of public concern.' 48 They feared that one branch of Congress could by itself limit the scope of constitutional protection by summarily denying citizens the right of prayer." 49 Barring consideration of a class of petitions was criticized as an arbitrary act, akin to a judicial decision pronounced in advance of the facts.' 50 Adams and others declared that minority political expression would be silenced if petitioning were confined only to those subjects approved by a majority in Congress.' 5 ' At bottom, the "gag" opponents insisted that the right to petition implied duties to hear, consider, debate, and decide. 152 Even if want of authority required the ultimate denial of a petition, the preliminary rights of communication and consideration ought not to be infringed. 15 This logic took vivid illustration in the controversy over Adams's introduction of a petition from Haverhill, Massachusetts, requesting
dissolution of the Union. Members moved to censure Adams on the grounds that the right of petition could not extend to destruction of the sovereign power petitioned. Adams, while admitting that Congress could not take such action, denied that the unavailability of the requested remedy should preclude the processes of petition and hearing. Recalling the events of 1776 and "'the right of the people to alter, to change, to destroy, the Government if it becomes oppressive to them,' " Adams concluded, "'I rest that petition on the Declaration of Independence.' "1
Northerners warned that no government should assume that it could not reason with its citizens. Hence, for Haverhill townspeople and abolitionists alike, Adams' response was: "'I say that if the petition is referred and answered, it will satisfy the petitioners.' ""5 Together with a faith in democracy came disdain for the belief that anti-slavery opinion could be silenced. One state communication to Congress described the "gag" as an "unphilosophical and absurd mode to stop the progress of reform, or the spread of fanaticism."'" 8 Adams, like Calhoun, sought to differentiate petition from assembly powers. Yet, whereas the representatives of the slave-holding states found balance in a presentation-reception distinction, Adams gave more authority to citizens. Citizens had the liberty, even the responsibility, to petition on any matter, irrespectively of the legislature's power of redress. Since both offer and consideration were indispensable to effective petitioning, the correct line lay between the guarantee of those two rights and the assembly discretion to deny or disapprove a particular petitioner's request. The right to petition carried a mandate of hearing, but not of approval.
Finally, abolitionists protested that the "gag rules" not only subverted popular self-government, but also nullified members' freedom of speech and proposal.1 57 A rule proscribing introduction of certain matters as offenses against the House, Southern States, or the Union, choked debate. Lawmaking subject to majority caprice, with the extent of encroachment varying with each "gag" resolution, was said to make a mockery of the speech and debate privilege of representatives. Accordingly, when the House clamored to censure Adams for acting on a petition from slaves, the New Englander's reply was acerbic: "The whole doctrine of contempts 154. S. BEMIs, supra note 139, at 427-31. Congressman Cushing also came to the defense of the Haverhill petitioners and stated that any person has a right to be heard, "be he fanatic or be he philosopher." Address by Congressman Cushing, supra note 142, at 3. The controversy over the right to petition, which involved diametrically opposed congressional interpretations of the First Amendment, highlights the elasticity of constitutional language. The essence of the dispute centered on whether the petition clause supplied merely a "presentative" right-the individual's right to voice grievances to Congress-or whether it went further to dictate a procedure for disposal, with an unqualified requirement that Congress receive and consider petitions. Despite the clear colonial practice that linked petitioning to a corollary duty of legislative response, the Southern "gag" proponents successfully challenged this link and subsumed the right within free expression. The abrupt defeat of a right so indispensable to the colonial legislative process has two explanations: first, the frailty of the right of petition, a right uprooted from the social and political context in which its use had flourished, and second, more broadly, the assailability of any principle, however fundamental, when confronted by interests as entrenched as slavery. Transport a right from an altogether different political culture into a period of intense political antagonisms, and constitutional language and purpose are readily subverted. The right to petition was ill-fitted to lawmaking in the national legislature; but, perhaps more decisively, it had the misfortune to become inextricably entangled in the slavery crisis.
To explore the consequences of reinstituting the colonial process of lawmaking and representation through popular petitions would be to reargue the Federalist-Antifederalist debate, in a twentieth century context. That is too ambitious. 159 Holding to historical argument nonetheless suggests an . 10, 1986) . Specific lessons could be taken from colonial America, where it has been shown that assemblies' treatment of petitions involved processes of fair notice and hearing. The modern state does attach a right of petition hearing to some executive and administrative bodies' proceedings. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982) (agency rulemaking). This view identifies petitioning with the legislative process, as an indispensable complement to suffrage: by the latter citizens elect their government, and by the former they important lesson. The historian may chide legal scholars and judges alike who, while protesting fidelity to the Framers' intent, have in fact acquiesced in the evisceration of the original meaning of the right to petition, a right which had compelled legislatures to accord citizens' petitions fair hearing and consideration.
Legal scholarship must be honest. If courts continue to confine the First Amendment petition guarantee to presentation, or free expression as in McDonald' and Minnesota State Board, 6 ' they should be candid about the inconsistency with the Framers' intent. To be sure, rights and methods of lawmaking may be bound to historical eras. The original character of the right to petition may impose an untenable restraint on the autonomy and agenda setting power of the federal legislature. But until this conclusion is made, court opinions will appear to rest not on the Framers' intent, but on deference to the resolve of antebellum Congresses to defeat a right which threatened the institution of slavery.
continually inform it of their will. A reassertion in the legislative sphere of this procedural requirement of consideration might check legislative irresponsibility, especially the ills of ignorance, arbitrariness, and majoritarian insensitivity.
160. McDonald v. U.S., 105 S. Ct. 2787 Ct. (1985 ; see supra note 2. 161. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 217, 283 ("The Constitution does not grant to members of the public generally a right to be heard by public bodies making decisions of policy.").
